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PREFACE
Decisions on future energy strategies have to be based on
a comparison of their risks and benefits. The risk of a given
technology is variable and may· be further reduced by additional
safety measures which, however, usually incur additional expendi-
tures.
Cost-effectiveness analysis is one methodology which can
be used to address the question of "how safe is safe enough"
and which level of risk is "as low as reasonably achievable"(known
as the"'ALARA" approach). This paper ' introduces atnethod which does
not limit the analysis of cost-effectiveness of additional safety
equipment to a specific facility, but provides a systems approach
which allows consideration of the total economic system of a
country.
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ABSTRACT
Safety expenditures usually follow the law of diminishing
returns, i.e. marginal cost of risk reduction increases pro-
gressively with the level of safety achieved. Though the risk
of a facility can in principle be reduced below any given value
it is not possible to reduce the risk to zero, to reach "absolute
safety". This poses ｾ ｨ ･ ､ Ｎ ｱ ｵ ･ ｳ ｴ ｩ ｯ ｮ ｡ ｢ ｑ ｵ ｴ Ｎ ｟ ｣ Ｎ Ｚ ｴ Ｎ ｨ ･ level at which further
risk"reduction is no longer cost-effective.
This paper demonstrates that these considerations are only
valid if a system element (e.g. a plant) is analysed. When the
total economic system is considered another source of risk has
to be added: the occupational and public health effects associ-
ated with the production of safety equipment.
Using some simplifying assumptions and data from national
economic input-output tables and occupational accident statistics
it is possible to derive a linear relationship between the cost
of the safety equipment and the health effects caused by its
production. When this relation is combined with the. exponential
ｲ ｩ ｳ ｫ Ｚ Ｌ Ｚ ｣ ｯ ｳ ｴ Ｂ ｲ ﾷ ｾ ｩ Ｎ Ｓ ｩ ｩ ｯ ｮ ｳ ｨ ｩ ｰ of- the faciiity·,:Ttmder coneLdexat.Lon , the
combined curve exhibits a minimum value where the health effects
of producing the safety feature equals the health effects avoided
when it is installed. It is shown that if one probable. health
effect at some·unknown future, time is avoided by use of $ 30 mil-
lion of safety equipments, one equivalent health effect will
certainly occur at the present time. The problem of balancing
these two effects is a societal decision which is not addressed
herein.
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HOW SAFE IS "TOO" SAFE?
S. Black, F. Niehaus, D. Simpson
INTRODUCTION
Any activity of man involves some risk to his life or health.
Though it is possible to reduce these risks, it is not possible
to reach the "zero risk" or "absolute safety" that is often de-
manded. Once this general fact is recognized, it becomes neces-
sary to decide which risks are acceptable and to what extent risks
have to be reduced.
In the past, exposures to industrial risks were gradually
reduced until an acceptable level was reached. Modern techno-
logical systems are capable of hypothetical hazards so large
that determination of the appropriate level on the basis of ex-
perience is not acceptable. It is necessary to use predictive
methods to estimate these risks. Risk assessment (Otway et al.
1977) methodology implies the need for the formal (systematic)
evaluation of estimated risks using some defined acceptability
criteria.
There are three primary methods for this evaluation:
Putting Risks into Perspective
This approach has been most widely used and is based on the
assumption that a new risk is acceptable if it does not exceed
present levels of already accepted risks (Reactor Safety Study
1975) and it has been suggested that a new technology should
present a risk which is at least a factor of 10 lower than well-
established technologies (Higson 1978, Tattersall et ale 1972).
This approach poses the problem of the comparability of risks from
very different sources (e.g. airplanes with chemical plants) and
does not consider the value of a technology to society.
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Comparisons of Risks and Benefits
Once it has been established that a risk is not out of
proportion with other similar risks, a common basis for a com-
parison of technologies can be achieved by normalizing their
risks to a common measure of benefits which they can provide
to society. This approach implicitly assumes that for a higher
benefit a higher level of risk should be acceptable (Inhaber
1978, Black et ale 1978)
Cost-Effectiveness of Risk Reduction
The above-mentioned methods allow for a comparison of
options, however, they do not indicate whether these levels of
safety are adequate, or whether the risk should be reduced even
further. Safety philosophy require,s risks to be reduced to levels
"as low as reasonably achievable" (known as the ﾷ ａ ｌ ａ ｾ Ｂ approach).
Cost-effectiveness procedures may be used for this problem and
some relevant aspects are discussed below.
COST-EFFECTIVENESS OF RISK REDUCTION
It has been assumed that safety expenditures generally
follow the law of diminishing returns (Rowe Ｑ Ｙ Ｗ Ｗ Ｉ ｾ The general
relationship of this law is outlined in Figure 1 and has been
recognized in several case studies (Roy and Ciceri 1978, U.S.
; ',;, ,Environmental Protection Agency 1976). Two main conclusions can
be drawn from this diagram:
1. the marginal cost of risk reduction increases with
the level of safety achieved; and
2. for any given safety level it is possible to reduce
the risk even further, however, it is not possible to
reduce the risk to zero.
Society is, however, constrained by the limited resources
at its disposal and this poses the question about "how safeis safe
enough?" (Fischhoff et ale 1978) The two observations from
Figure 1 imply that "safe enough" is always determined by an
arbitrary compromise between the two objectives of the efficient
use of limited resources (minimizing costs) and achieving the
highest safety (minimizing risk). Since the units of these ob-
jectives are money and health effects respectively, any such so-
lution implies a specified expenditure per unit of risk reduction.
In particular, the use of mortality risk leads to a monetary
value being assigned to a human life (Strictly, determination
of the value of a human life would be only one method of de-
riving an appropriate expenditure for risk reduction. In ge-
neral, the expenditure will be defined by the societal consensus
over the resource allocation for safety. Although this value
will be quoted in dollars per life saved, it will not in fact
be the "value of human life"'.) Such values can be compared for
safety expenditures in various risk areas. It has been suggested
(Linnerooth 1977) that a value of $ 300,000 per life should be
-3- .
SMOOTHED COST-EFFECTIVENESS CURVE
•COST OF RISK REDUCTION -----
Source: Rowe (1977).
Figure 1. Cost-effectiveness of risk reduction.
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chosen which could be weighted by some factors describing spe-
cific attributes of the actual situation. Such a procedure
implies the objective that safety expenditures should be spent
most cost-effectively on various technologies but does not answer
the more general question of "how safe is safe enough?"
In contrast to the above approach, this paper will suggest
that a practical limit to risk reduction does exist. The typi-
cal curve shown in Figure I relates to one particular technolo-
gical facility and the fact that such a plant or technology is
only one element in the total economic system is overlooked.
Therefore, the fact that the safety measures themselves cannot
be produced without risk is also neglected. Thus it follows
that Figure I applies only to the system element (e.g. a plant).
If the total system is considered, however, the curve from
Figure I will actually have a minimum risk and this will be
described in more detail below.
RISK IDENTIFICATION AND QUANTIFICATION
The term "risk" is used in a variety of contexts, generally
to describe the possibility of negative outcomes. But its pre-
cise meaning is usually not defined (Schaefer 1978). "Risk"
is used here to mean some measure of the detrimental effects
that may be associated with a technology. The technical data
that describe these risks may be classified into:
events and their probability of occurrence (e.g.
emissions, accident sequences, wind direction, etc.)
consequences of these events (e.g. health effects,
property damage, etc.)
distribution of consequences within the population
affected
uncertainties in these estimates
The measurement of the technological risk in terms of these
categories may be termed the "objective" part of the risk,
although they will often have a certain degree of subjectivity,
introduced by the judgments of the technical experts. However,
the combination rule for aggregation of these data is not spe-
cified by any natural law. Therefore, there is no such thing as
an objective unified measure of risk. Any mathematical pro-
cedure to combine these data is part of an evaluative process
and thereby subjective.
Since methods for integrating the above mentioned cate-
gories of technical data which describe risks have not yet been
sufficiently developed, the measure to be used here is the
expected value, where risk is defined as the multiplicative
combination of probability and the consequences of an event.
It should be noted that this procedure has the effect of treating
one death per year as equivalent to 100 deaths occurring once
in 100 years.
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Further, these calculations will be limited to impacts on
human health. This poses the difficult problem of aggregating
risks due to deaths and illnesses. As sooner or later everybody
has to die, death will be quantified in terms of loss of years
of life. It is common to equate each fatality with a loss of
6,000 man-days (U.S. Atomic Energy Commission 1974, American
National Standards Institute 1968), and this procedure is used
in this paper. However, it is possible to apply the following
methodology to any otherwise defined measure of risk.
THE RISK OF PRODUCING GOODS AND SERVICES
The Methodology
The risk of illness and death is inherent in any production
of goods and services in an economy. Usually, these risks are
expressed in terms of hazards per year and million people in-
volved. Table 1 gives an overview of these risks for the Fe-
deral Republic of Germany in 1973. It should be noted that
these risks vary within two orders of magnitude for different
branches of industry.
In combination with data from economic input-output tables,
these data can be used to calculate the total risk involved in
the production of goods and services. The procedure applied is
similar to the ｣ ｡ ｬ ｣ ｵ ｾ ｾ ｴ ｾ Ｙ ｮ ｳ ｰ ･ ｲ ｦ ｯ ｲ ｭ ｾ ､ for energy analysis which
have been described in detail elsewhere (Kolb et ale 1975,
Niehaus 1975, Chapman 1974, Herendeen 1974).
Table 1. Selected occupational fatality risks in the
Federal Republic of Germany, 1973.
Individual
Industry rlskper year
Inland shipping 1.6 x 10-3
Mining 1.1 x 10-3
Underground construction 6 x 10-4
Iron and steel 2.5 x 10-4
Textiles, clothing 8 x 10-5
. .
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Figure 2. Structure of ｩ ｮ ｰ ｵ ｴ ｾ ｯ ｵ ｴ ｰ ｵ ｴ
coefficient matrix.
An input-output table describes the economic interrelations
of an economy in monetary values. In order to allow for easier
handling it can be reduced to an input-output coefficient matrix.
Its principal design is outlined in Figure 2. An element Aij
gives the percentage of the total output of sector j which has
been obtained in form of preprocessed goods from sector i (de-
rived from monetary values). Yi denotes total final consumption
of goods from sector i and Xi denotes total production of sector
i. Thus, assuming linearity and time invariance, total production
of sectors can be written as:
n
X. = E A .. X. + Y.
1 . -1 1J} 1J-
n = number of sectors. (l)
Total production of sector i is the sum of final consumer pro-
ducts and preprocessed goods for other sectors of the economy.
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This can be written more easily in the form of vectors Ｈ ･ ｾ ｧ Ｎ X)
and matrices (e.g. ｾ ｾ as
x = AX + Y
=-
It follows that
X = (I A) -1 Y
:::!::::=:=::::::=:: I = unit matrix.
=
(2 )
(3)
{I - A)-l
- is'known as the'inverse Leontief matrix.
The elements of this matrix (I - A>i3 denote ｴ ｾ ･ Ｎ ｰ ･ ｲ ｣ ･ ｮ ｴ ｡ ｧ ･
of a value unit which has to be produced ny sector 1 ln terms
of preprocessed goods for all other sectors in order to allow
for the production of one value unit of goods of sector j.
Its meaning is better understood if the matrix is developed
into a series
{I _ A)-l = £ + ｾ + ｾＲ
If one considers the vector of final consumption Y then
the vector for final production ｾ ｏ and the nth step of-prepro-
cessing are given (for n = 1,2 ..• J by
= I Y
= -
( 4)
ｾ ｬ
Z A Z = Ｘ｟ Ｒ ｾｾ = =-1
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Total production therefore is
00
X = L Z
n=O -n
2
= Ｈｾ + ｾ + ｾ ... )Y (5)
which is equivalent to Equation (3).
This approach can be extended to calculate the total risk
of the production of goods by superimposing "risk flows" on
monetary flows.
A "Specific Risk Matrix" S is constructed where the elements
S ..1J
R ..
= 1Jx:-
J
(6 )
denote the value specific risk of the type i in sector j and R ..
denote the total health effects of type i in a one year's pro_1 J
duct ion of goods from sector j.
Thus matrix S
monetary values Ｈ ･ ｾ ｧ Ｎ
matrix and consists of
sidered.
The product
has the dimension of health effects per
death per million $). It is not a square
as many lines as health effects are con-
( 7)
denotes the health effect of type i which occurs in sector k
through production of preprocessed goods for all other sectors
to enable production of one value unit of final products from
sector f. The summation
(8)
therefore, gives the total risk (including all steps of prepro-
cessing) of type i for the production of one unit of final pro-
ducts. In form of matrices this can be written as
( 9)
Results
Using data from the Federal Republic of Germany (Bundesre-
gierung 1974; Deutsches Institut fUr Wirtschaftsforschung 1972) ,
the matrices described above have been constructed. Because
of the overlap of several sectors in the various statistics it
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became necessary to aggregate the original 60 sectors of the
input-output table and the 38 sectors of accident statistics
to 19 sectors (e.g. machine tool industry and electrical equip-
ment sector had to be aggregated). Table 2 gives the results
of such a calculation for a sample of sectors. It should be
borne in mind that, for example, the data on construction already
include the data of production of preprocessed goods which this
sector receives from other sectors such as "mining" or "stone
and earth" industry. The first column gives the total working
hours which have to be used to produce goods of the value of
DM 1 million of that sector. The large differences reflect
the various proportions of labour, know-how and capital (machi-
nery) involved.
The other columns give the respective health effects. It
can be seen that occupational accidents and job-related driving
fatalities are of the same order of magnitude. Column 4 gives
occupational chronic deaths. They occurred during the year
under consideration. However, they have been caused by exposure
to pollutants during previous work.
THE RISK OF PRODUCTION OF SAFETY EQUIPMENT
These data can be used to calculate the risk of producing
safety equipment. Throughout the paper it will be assumed that,
for these general considerations, safety equipment requires
30% construction
10% services, and
60% machine tool and electrical equipment.
The data are summarized in Table 3. For the aggregation of
lost working days due to illnesses and fatalities one death ｨ ｡ ｾ Ｓ
been equated to 6,000 man-days. To the total of about 11 . 10
fatalities, equivalent to about 65 lost man-days, illnesses add
about 45 %.
These data only refer to occupational effects. In addition
health effects to the general public have to be considered. They
occur mainly due to emissions from plants, including emissions
from energy production which has been used to produce these goods.
Unfortunately, neither data on emissions nor on health effects .
exist which could be used for calculations like the one above. '
Therefore, the following calculation is suggested which can
establish an order of magnitude estimate. Table 4 gives a com-
parison of total emissions from energy production and other in-
dustries in the Federal Republic of Germany in 1970 (Niehaus 1977).
From this table one might conclude that about 30% of public
health effects are caused by emissions from industry and about
70 % from energy producti on • As about 50 % of energy production
is used in industry for production of goods, including trans-
port (Kernforschungsanlage ｊ ｾ ｬ ｩ ｣ ｨ GmbH 1977), it is reasonable
to assume that 50% of the health effects from emissions from
energy production can be assigned to industry and that they are
roughly equal to those from the industrial emissions.
Table 2. Total working hours and occupational health effects for production of goods and
services of a value of DM 10° .
Total occupational Job-related Occupational Lost
workLnq accidental driving chronic working
Industry hours dearhS fatilities deat...hs hours
10-2] [ 10-2] ＱＰＭｾ
Machine tools & 7,790 0.235 0.177 0.151 208
electrical equiprn.
Mining 30,600 0.958 0.170 4.37 520
Stone and -earth 23,500 0.591 I 0.178 0.447 219
Textiles and 7,410 0.135 0.157 0.116 168
clothing
Services, provi- 5,780 0.283 0.105 0.103 59
sions & fine foods
Construction 41,600 0.746 0.296 0.172 315
I
f-'
o
I
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Table 3. Total ｾ ｣ ｣ ｵ ｰ ｡ ｴ ｩ ｯ ｮ ｡ ｬ risk of producing"DM 1 million
safety equipment.
Total working hours 17,700
Lost working hours 225
Occupational accidental deaths 3.93
·
10-3
Driving fatalities 2.06
·
10-3
Occupational chronic deaths 0.153 . 10-3
Total deaths 6.14 · 10-3
.L: equivalent * 10-3death 10.8 .
or
L:equiValent *lost working days 65
*1 death = 6,000 man-days
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Table 4. Emissions in the Federal Republic of Germany, 1970 .
._- ._.
-
-_.
.__.
Emission Percentage [%1
Pollutant
[106t/a J Energy Industry
CO 11.2 83 17
80 2 ＵｾＳ 72 28
C H 3.3 76 24
n m
NO 2.6 98 2
x
Particulates 2.2 55 45
Using the method described, it is possible to calculate
the total energy necessary to produce industrial goods. A de-
tailed calculation has been made (Niehaus 1975), which gives a
value of about 35 kg coal equivalent per OM 100 production of
machinery and electric equipment goods. If it is further assumed
that energy is produced by coal, then data (Tattersall et al.
1972) on public health effects from energy production (3 - 22
deaths/GWa(e)) can be combined with the specific energy require-
ments. Assuming an efficiency of 40% from coal-fired plants,
public risks from emissions of the required energy production
would be about 1.3 • 10- 3 deaths per OM 106 for an average value
of 10 deaths/GWa(e). This value might be too high by a factor of
three ,or ｴ ｯ ｾ ｬ ｾ ｷ by a factor of tWO._ 3Adding the effects of in-dustrlal emlSSlons a value of 3 • 10 deaths per OM 106 is
assumed. A comparison with data from Table 3 shows that public
effects from emissions are less than one third of the total
occupational risks.
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Public effects from job-related driving accidents are
assumed to be equivalent to occupational driving accidents.
Therefore, the total occupational and public risk of the pro-
duction of safety equipment is estimated to be
-3 615 • 10 equivalent deaths/OM 10
or
90 lost man-days
These data are 6summarized in Table 5. Therefore, theproduction of OM 65 • 10 safety equipment has a risk of 1 equi-
valent death.
Table 5. Occupational and public effects of production of
OM 1 million safety equipment.
Occupational
lost working hours 225
total death 6.14 . 10-3
ｾ･ｱｕｩｖ｡ｬ･ｮｴ death 10.8 . 10-3
Public (equivalent death)
energy production 1.3 . 10- 3
industrial production 1.3 . 10-3
driving accidents 2.06 • 10-3
ｾ･ｱｕｩｖ｡ｬ･ｮｴ death 4.66 • 10-3
Total
ｾ ･ ｱ ｕ ｩ ｖ ｡ ｬ ･ ｮ ｴ death 15 • 10-3
or
ｾ ･ ｱ ｕ ｩ ｖ ｡ ｬ ･ ｮ ｴ lost man-days 90
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APPLICATION OF RESULTS
General Implications to Standard Setting
It was shown above that health effects of approximateGy 1equivalent death are caused by the production of $ 30 • 10 worth
of safety equipment as specified in this paper. This suggests
that the general relationship of cost-effectiveness of risk re-
duction, as outlined in Figure 1, should be modified, as indi-
cated in Figure 3, in order to represent health effects in the
total economic system. Any achievement in technological safety
through additional equipment has to be paid for not only by
additional costs but also by the occupational and public health
effects caused by the production of this safety equipment. This
risk may be considered to be proportional to these safety invest-
ments. Therefore, if the total system of an economy is considered,
the risk cannot be reduced to any given value; beyond a certain
limit the risk increases again with increasing expenditures for
safety equipment. The minimum of the ｲ ｩ ｳ ｫ ｾ ｣ ｯ ｳ ｴ relationship is
given when the marginal cost of risk reduction, i.e. the first
derivative of the curve labelled "operation" is equal to the
slope of the linear relationship for investments. (1 death!
$ 30 . 106). The initial design, without additions of safety
\
\
\
\
\
\
\
\
\
\
,f- TOTAL SYSTEM
t
INVESTMENT
COST ---,)
Figure 3. Principal relationship of cost-effectiveness
of risk reduction considering the total
economic system.
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measures, poses a risk (So) that is determined by factors in-
trinsic to the technological process. As a consequence, no
fixed number can be attached to the absolute values of the risks
or the costs .defining the minimum.
Thus any expenditure on safety equipment has the effect of
reducing the expected number of health effects predicte1to
occur during the lifetime operation of the plant at the expense
of causing some effects during the construction phase. Moreover,
if the safety investments are greater than the amount indicated
by the minimum of the curve, then the current health impact will
actually be larger than the reduction in future expected effects.
For example, Table 6 gives a listing of safety expenditures
(Sagan 1976) that have been applied or proposed in various areas.
It is apparent that the minimum value, at a marginal cost of
$ 30 • 106 per expected equivalent death reduced, has actually
been exceeded.
However, even expenditure at the minimum of the curve where
the same number of health effects are merely antedated still re-
presents a drain on societal resources. In terms of expected
effects there is no net benefit, but Table 3 shows that the
avoidance of one future expected equivalent death (thereby
causing it today) requires about 20 people to work for 30 years
(600 man-years) in the production of safety equipment. In
addition, it ignores the possibility that medical and technical
advances will be able to reduce the risk in an alternative
manner in the future.
Safety expenditures at lower cost than indicated by the
minimum would result in a net reduction of health effects and
a standard value would have to be determined by a trade-off
between required costs and man-power, and reduction of health
effects. These relationships will be studied in more detail
below.
As has been described above practical case studies generally
show that costs of risk reduction follow an exponential law and
in some cases even exponential power functions. As a conser-
vative estimate an exponential function is assumed here.
Therefore, the total system risk-cost 'relationship of
Figure 3 can be described as
C
--
(lO)
where R = risk level, c = cost of safety equipment.
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Table 6. Marginal costs of risk reduction.
Food poisoning control
Automobile seat belts
High-rise flats fire control
50% flue gas desulphurization
applied to plant with
30 m stack
120 m stack
$ 106 per
life saved
0.03
0.3
40
0.2
2.5
Lives saved
per $.106
33
3
0.025
5
0.4
Nuclear plants
recombiners 17 * 0.06
6 charcoal beds * 0.02443
12 charcoal beds ** 300 * 0.003
iodine ** 1,000 * 0.001treatment
remote siting 10,000* 0.0001
4
* based on 1 fatal effect per 10 man-rem.
**proposed, not implemented.
Source: Sagan (1976), u.S. Environmental Protection Agency
(1976).
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with:
RO = risk of initial design
Co = constant for a particular technology
r = specific risk of producing safety equipment
p (1 death/$ 30 . 106)
The minimum is derived by
dR
dc
c
--
e· c O + = 0r p ( 11)
Therefore, when the costs are:
the minimum risk level ｾ is given by
(12)
(13 )
As outlined above the initial design described by RO and
c = 0 has been arbitrarily defined. Therefore, no meaning is
attached to the absolute values of ｾ and c M. It has to be
emphasized that these values should not be used to compare
different technologies. They only indicate the minimum expected
risk achievable given a specific design.
However, the shape of the minimum is the same no matter which
design Ro has been chosen as initial value. Sensitivity studiestherefore should not be made with regard to relative changes in
risk or cost but with regard to their absolute values.
Figure 4 indicates graphically the impact of r on the first
derivative R' = ｾｒ (see Equation 11) ." Taking r .. inio account
shifts the asympe8te for the operation curve inEo positive values.
Because of the exponential shape of the curve, ｣ ｾ ｩ is sensitive
to the value of r p.
The negative inverted function of R' gives the marginal
costs of risk reduction
dc
= fCc) =
-dR Ｈ Ｚ ｾ Ｉ
1
c
--
e cO - r p
(14)
-18-
dR t
dc I
dRIdc total
Ｍ Ｏ ｾ - _ ..-
operation
f
r
I
I
c
Figure 4. Principal relationship of R '
(arbitrary scale).
dR
= dc
This function is displayed in Figure 5. In contrast to the
operation curve for the facility, for which marginal improvements
in risk can always be made at some expenditure, the curve for
the total system shows that the marginal costs of risk reduction
become infinite at cM. Expenditures above this result in nega-tive marginal costs; the risk is increasing.
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operation
total system
c
Figure 5. Principal relationship of marginal"costs
of risk reduction (arbitrary scale).
Application to
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency Results
Consideration of specific risk r p
The EPA (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 1976) presents
cost-effectiveness calculations for risk reduction systems in the
total fuel cycles for pressurised water (PWR) and boiling water
(BWR) nuclear power reactors. The inverted marginal costs of
risk reduction are plotted on a log scale in Figure 6. It can
be seen that they fit the dashed linear line quite well, indi-
cating an exponential relationship. If a specific risk r of
" p
1000. '00()
PWR DATA I BWR DATA
<J>
/00 I <J>\0 \0 100.0 0
<j r-l
<, ｾ
II) II)
+J /0.0 +J ,OJ)o oQJ QJ
l.H l.H
l.H l.H ＯＮｏｾ ! r_ efff:<1 r p eff M<J <, <J
II) " II)
+J "
"
..j,J
II)
QI II) 4.10 rp 0 r po o <,
r-l r-l I
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Figure 6. Cost-effectiveness of risk reduction.
-21-
1 death/$ 30 . 106 is applied, it can be seen that several
safety reduction systems have been considered that would in
fact prevent less expected health effects than would be caused
during their production.
At total cumulative costs
BWR, the marginal cost of risk
economic system--would become
6
of about $ 12 . 10 for
reduction--considering
infinite (See Figures 4
PI"1R and
the total
and 5).
It has to be noted that equating one effect in the future
with one effect during construction already contains a value
judgment. We agree with the suggestions (Cohen and Tewes 1979)
that no discounting factor should be applied for future effects;
that therefore one effect in the future should be considered as
serious as one effect today. However, this does introduce a
factor of conservatism into the calculations as no credit is
given to the development of improved methods for medical treat-
ment in the future.
Consideration of r p and labour requirements
As discussed above, it is not suggested that this absolute
limit where marginal costs of risk reduction become infinite,
should be the barrier to risk reduction. It has been explained
that, at this minimum achievable risk, 615 man-years of labour
requirements would be associated with shifting each health
effect from the time period of operation (or later) to the
time period of construction.
The labour requirements may be included in the specific
production risk r p in order to present a more realistic suggested
limit for safety ｾ ｸ ｰ ･ ｮ ､ ｩ ｴ ｵ ｲ ･ Ｎ However, this poses the value
question concerning the aggregation of health effects and
labour needs. One way to look at this problem is to consider
the extent to which society is prepared to utilize the available
labour resources in the reduction of technological hazards. It
is clear that this problem needs considerable study and a solu-
tion cannot be provided here. However, if it is assumed that
society should expend 1 man-year of work to gain one man-year of
life, one may equate, expected effects and the equivalent man-
years of labour. This would allow for an aggregation in terms
of man-lives. If one health effect is estimated to lead to a
loss of one life, or 6,000 man-days, then 17,800 working hours
per DM 106 would be equivalent to about 22 man-lives per $ 30 . 106.
Thus the value of the effective specific production risk
r p eff becomes
r =p eff
22 man-lives
r p + $ 30 . 106 =
23 man-lives
$ 30 . 106- (15)
This value is also indicated in Figure 6 and is clearly
dominated by the labour requirements.
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The condition for minimum risk using this revised value,
r p eff, is that the marginal cost of risk reduction has to be
equal to $ 1.3 . 106•
Application to Remote Reactor Siting
Based on data from the draft document of WASH 1400 the mar-
ginal costs of risk reduction for remote reactor siting were cal-
culated (Niehaus et ale 1977). Figure 7 plots those marginal
costs of risk reduction in $/equivalent man-rem versus distance
between a nuclear plant and a densely populated area. Using the
equivalence between 1 death and 10 4 man-rem, l/r can be con-
verted into $ 3,OOO/man-rem or $ 30,OOO/man-rem,Prespectively.
These values are also indicated in Figure 7. However, they are
not conservative estimates because the construction of high-vol-
tage transmission lines will involve a higher risk than will the
production of safety equipment. These results show that, beyond
acute death
310 man-rem
r-, ｾ ｰ = s .3·0, OOO/man-rem
+-1 acute death ｾ 10 4 man-rem
---- _...........--_.__._.-
; = $ 3,000/man-rem
p
5010 20 30 40 60
.*Distance
70
(kIn)
80 90 100 ] 10
*Distance between nuclear power plant and densely populated area.
Figure 7. Marginal costs of risk reduction for remote reactor siting.
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a distance of about 30 km, more health effects are expected to
occur during construction of the transmission line than are
expected to be saved through remote reactor siting. If a
rpeff of 23 man-lives per $ 30 • 106 is used, the equivalent
conversions for l/rpeff become $ 130 and $ 1,300 per man-rem
and these are far below the marginal costs of risk reduction
implied by remote reactor siting as plotted in Figure 7. This
means that the extra labour man-hours for construction of the
transmission line will be greater than the expected loss in
population lifetime for all conceivable accidents to the reactor
system.
Reduction of Radiation Doses to Nuclear Plant Operators
A value of $ ＱＬＰＰＰＯｭ｡ｾｲ･ｭｨ｡ｳ been advocated by the U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission and others (Niehaus and Otway 1977,
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 1975) as an appropriate index
for use in determining the cost-effectiveness of nuclear radi-
ation risk reduction measures. From the figures given above
it is evident that if the risk is to be reduced by construction
of added safety features, then this value is an upper limit
from a risk and labour time aspect. Conversely, it has been
argued (Atomic Industrial Forum 1978) that if radiation expo-
sures can be reduced by planning and administrative procedures,
then costs can be minimised by reduced down-time and use of
fewer men. In this case, the risk reduction would not be asso-
ciated with added risks elsewhere in the system and the minimum
risk would not be applicable.
CONCLUSIONS
It has usually been assumed that it is always possible to
reduce a risk below any given value and that the only limitation
is the associated increased costs. As a result of this assump-
tion the question of "how safe is safe enough" is posed. How-
ever, such a relationship only holds true for a single system
element (e.g. a specific facility). If the total economic system
is considered one has to take account of the fact that safety
equipment has to be produced. This production leads to an
occupational risk and also a risk to the public in the same
way as the manufacture of any industrial goods. This risk is
estimated to be one equivalent death per $ 30 . 106 worth of
safety equipment produced. In addition, about 615 man-years
of labour are involved.
Thus this paper concludes that the risk-cost relationship
actually shows a minimum beyond which additional expenditures
intended to reduce a risk will actually increase it. It has
been demonstrated that several applied or proposed risk reduction
measures already exceed such a minimum level.
The levels quoted here have been derived in a general manner
and may not be applicable to any particular situation, neverthe-
less they do reflect the orner of magnitude that would be obtained
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with a more specific analysis. However, before this methodo-
logy is applied to any particular cost-effectiveness problem the
following aspects have to be considered in greater detail:
how to define risks (expected health effects have been
used here);
how to compare health effects and labour requirements
(and costs);
how to compare health effects today versus health
effects which would occur in the future: and
how to compare occupational and public health effects.
One may deduce from the results shown above and using the
assumptions given that there is a tendency for present day expendi-
tures on certain safety items to be excessive. In other words
the risk is not minimised. However, the basic assumption,
namely that risk ought to be minimised, has not been questioned.
Although cost-effectiveness techniques can be used to identify
the minimum risk, no evaluation is given as to whether this
minimum is itself low enough. The solution to this problem
which is closely allied to the four aspects mentioned above,
demands further investigation into individual and group atti-
tudes towards risk and risk reduction.
The conclusions drawn in this paper do depend on the various
assumptions made. Alternative assumptions could give different
results, however, the general methodology is valid and could
still be applied.
-25-
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